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ABSTRACT: The creation of two different vaccines to eradicate polio stands out as one of mo-
dern science most important accomplishments. The current article examines Swedish polio 
vaccine research, the vaccination campaign and especially how the Cutter incident came to 
affect Swedish Science, scientists and society in the 1950s. Sweden is one of the few countries 
that came to produce its own inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) in the 1950s, a type of vaccine 
they never abandoned. This article highlights the sometimes conflicting approaches between 
medical science on one hand and media and public on the other. The Swedish researchers did 
not agree with Jonas Salk’s methods for producing a safe vaccine and had reserved attitudes 
when the Salk vaccine was announced, something that Swedish media disapproved of. After 
the Cutter incident media’s representation of Swedish polio scientists became far more positive. 
The article also shows the development and distribution of a Swedish IPV and that contrary to 
some other countries Sweden did not doubt all American manufacturers and imported Salk 
IPV for the first polio vaccination campaign.
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1. Introduction
Scandinavia was one of the first regions struck by polio epidemics in the late 
nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century it had become obvious 
that polio was to be part of the epidemiologic pattern of the peninsula for 
a long time 1. Although polio cases were reported every year from 1905, 
 1. Paul, John. The history of poliomyelitis. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 1971, p. 83.
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there was a decline after 1915 only to increase in the 1930s. Denmark and 
Sweden endured two of its worst epidemics in 1952 and 1953 2 and if no 
prevention or cure was to be found, the future looked terrifying. During 
a meeting with the Swedish Medical Association in May 1954, the well-
known virologist and bacteriologist professor, Sven Gard, declared: «unless 
effective control measures are undertaken, we must expect a further increase 
in attack rates in the future» 3.
Less than one year later, on 22 April 1955 in Ann Arbor, United States, 
surrounded by enthusiastic media an inactivated polio vaccine (IPV), 
produced by Dr. Jonas Salk, was declared as safe and effective 4. In 1962 
a second polio vaccine —the live attenuated polio vaccine (OPV)— was 
licensed and released for manufacture 5. These two vaccines (although 
modified and improved since then) have successfully combated polio and 
today it is difficult to imagine a world without its positive effects. Less well 
known is that Sweden came to produce its own vaccine and went from being 
the country with the highest incidence rates in polio to be cleared from 
polio within seven years 6. Since 1988 there has been a largely successful 
global effort to eradicate polio and recently there has been an intensified 
discussion of the final stages of the «polio endgame» 7.
The creation of two different vaccines to eradicate polio stands out as 
one of modern science’s most important accomplishments. For historians 
of medicine, the history of poliomyelitis mirrors and provides valuable 
perspectives concerning the development of modern medicine, science in 
general and national and international public health, all rounded off with 
an impressive gallery of authoritative personalities all devoted to finding 
a solution to stop polio epidemics. Many of these aspects are reinforced 
 2. Lassen, Henry C. A. The epidemic of poliomyelitis in Copenhagen, 1952. Proceeding of the 
Royal Society o Medoicine. 1954; 47 (1): 67-71. Axelsson, Per. Höstens Spöke. De svenska 
polioepidemiernas historia. Stockholm: Carlssons; 2004, p. 142. Author´s translation.
 3. Gard, Sven. Den hygieniska profylaxen. Nordisk Medicin. 1954; 52 (2): 1682-1685 (1685). 
 4. Oshinsky, David M. Polio. An American story. New York: Oxford University Press; 2006, p. 202-
213.
 5. Paul, n. 1, p. 456.
 6. Fagraeus, Astrid; Böttiger, Margaretha. Polio vaccination in Sweden. Review of Infectious Diseases. 
1980; 2 (2): 274-276. 
 7. Aylward, Bruce; Yamada, Tadataka. The polio endgame. The New England Journal of Medicine. 
2011; 364: 2273-2275.
The Cutter incident and the development of a Swedish polio vaccine, 1952-1957
Dynamis 2012; 32 (2): 311-328
313
in the steadily growing academic and popular literature on the subject 8. 
The fascination of the history of polio might also be attributed to the fact 
that there were several elements and incidents that halted and even could 
have reversed the successful outcome. The most intriguing and renowned 
has become known as the «Cutter incident» and concerns more than two 
hundred victims and eleven deaths caused by the IPV produced by the 
Cutter Laboratories in California. This debacle took place in April 1955, 
only two weeks after the IPV had been presented as «America’s gift to the 
world» 9. Instead of protecting against polio it gave the children polio. The 
Cutter incident did not only harm those exposed to the live polio vaccine, 
it halted the entire US programme for a brief period and it affected public 
trust in vaccines. As Paul Offit and others have shown it has had enduring 
effects on how the United States deal with pharmaceutical products. Cutter 
laboratories were responsible for the product and even if they had produced 
it to the best of their knowledge, they were «liable without fault» 10. But the 
echo of the Cutter incident reached farther than the American continent. 
Historian Alison Day has described the profound effects that the incident 
 8. For international studies of the history of polio epidemics focusing on medical science and 
society, see, for example, Paul, n. 1. Gould, Tony. A summer plague, Polio and its survivors. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 1995. Rogers, Naomi. Dirt and disease. Polio 
before FDR. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press; 1992. Hardy, Anne. Poliomyelitis and 
the neurologists: the view from England 1896-1966. Bulletin of the History of Medicine. 1997; 
71: 249-272. Grimshaw, Margret. Scientific specialization and the poliovirus controversy in the 
years before World War II. Bulletin of the History of Medicine. 1995; 69: 44-65. Rutty, Chris-
topher. The middle-class plague: epidemic polio and Canadian State, 1936-1937. Canadian 
Bulletin of Medical History. 1996; 13: 277-314. Benison, Saul. Speculation and experimenta-
tion in early poliomyelitis research. Clio Medica. 1975; 10: 1-22. Benison, Saul. International 
medical cooperation: Dr. Albert Sabin, live poliovirus vaccine and the Soviets. Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine. 1982; 56: 460-483. Smith, Jane S. Patenting the sun. Polio and the Salk 
vaccine. New York: Anchor Books; 1990. Wyatt, Harold. V. Poliomyelitis. In: Kiple, Kenneth F. The 
Cambridge world history of human disease. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993, 
p. 943-950. Shell, Marc. Polio and its aftermath. The paralysis of culture. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press; 2005. Smallman-Raynor, Matthew R.; Cliff, Andrew D., eds. Poliomyelitis: a 
world geography: emergence to eradication. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006. Axelsson, 
Per. «Do not eat those apples, they have been on the ground!»: polio epidemics and pre-
ventive measures, Sweden 1880-1940s. Asclepio. 2009; 51 (1): 23-37. Nathanson, Neal; Kew, 
M. Olen. From emergence to eradication: the epidemiology of poliomyelitis deconstructed. 
American Journal of Epidemiology. 2010; 172 (11): 1213-1229.
 9. Oshinsky, n. 4, p. 215.
 10. Offit, Paul A. The Cutter incident. How America’s first polio vaccine led to the growing vaccine 
crisis. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 2005, p. 132-153. 
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had on the New Zealand polio immunisation programme 11. Ulrike Lindner 
has illustrated how the Cutter incident helped make both West Germany 
and the United Kingdom abandon planned campaigns and turn away 
from IPV 12.
By examining Swedish polio vaccine research, the vaccination campaign 
and especially how the Cutter incident came to affect Swedish science, 
scientists and society, this article aims to add another piece to the puzzle 
of polio history. It will start out by giving a background of the international 
research that led to the inactivated polio vaccine.
2. The long detour
As early as 1911, a confident and energetic Dr. Simon Flexner, the head of 
the young Rockefeller Institute, New York, was quoted as saying that they 
had learned how to prevent the disease and a cure «is not now far distant» 13. 
Exactly what made him speak those words is unclear and still a cure for polio 
has never been achieved despite hopeful words from prominent scientists. 
In 1935 it appeared as though a vaccine was just around the corner when 
two different medical research teams, one in New York and the other in 
Philadelphia developed vaccines. Historians claim there was a competition 
between them which quickly led from carrying out trials on monkeys, to 
using the vaccine on themselves and later on children. The results from the 
New York vaccine trails that included 7,000 children and was led by Drs. 
Brodie and Park, indicated that it had very limited or no effects against 
the poliovirus 14. The Philadelphia team, led by Dr. John Kolmer, tested its 
vaccine on 10,000 children and it had terrible results. Twelve persons got 
polio most likely from the vaccine and six of them died 15. Researchers all 
over the world were most likely deterred by these fallouts because it took 
 11. Day, Alison. «An American tragedy». The Cutter incident and its implications for the Salk polio 
vaccine in New Zealand 1955-1960. Health and History. 2009; 11 (2): 42-61.
 12. Lindner, Ulrike. Changing regulations and risk assessments: national responses to the introduction 
of inactivated polio vaccine in the UK and West Germany. In: Gradmann, Christoph; Simon, 
Jonathan, eds. Evaluating and standardizing therapeutic agents, 1890-1950. Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan; 2010, p. 229-251.
 13. Paul, n. 1, p. 116.
 14. Offit, n. 10, p. 17.
 15. Paul, n. 1, p. 261.
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fifteen years before polio vaccine research was seriously carried out again. 
But as David Oshinsky points out, «On one level, of course it had severely 
dampened expectation about the prospects of a safe and effective polio 
vaccine. On another level, however, it had fuelled curiosity of researchers 
about what had to be learned before proceeding again» 16.
There have been numerous accounts of what final crucial steps were 
needed to be taken to achieve a safe and effective polio vaccine 17. Usually 
three research findings occurring around 1950 are highlighted: 1) In 1949, 
Enders, Weller and Robbins, in Boston, revolutionised virology when they 
showed how to cultivate polio virus on tissues. This finding did not only 
save a huge number of monkeys, it also made it theoretically possible to 
—in a short amount of time— produce enough vaccine to provide to the 
parts in the world where polio appeared as an epidemic. This finding gave 
the three men the Nobel Prize in Medicine or Physics in 1954 18. 2) In the 
mid 1940s it was made obvious that poliovirus was more than one virus. In 
1948, researchers like Bodian and Howe at John Hopkins University, Salk in 
Pittsburgh and Paul and Trask at Yale tested a huge amount of strains and 
showed that poliovirus consisted of three different types. This was a crucial 
finding, since an effective vaccine would have to protect against all three 
types. 3) Polio virus was believed to not reach the blood but Dr. Dorothy 
Horstmann showed that the poliovirus could, in the early stages of infection, 
be found in the blood and that antibodies were formed and soon killed it 
(viremia). This indicated that a vaccine might be able to do the same 19.
John Paul writes that around 1952 there were several research teams 
around the world that had begun to do experiments to find a vaccine against 
polio. «Hopes were running high, and the opinion was widespread that it 
might not be so difficult to prevent poliomyelitis after all» 20. Building on 
the successes from Enders, Weller and Robbins, the American virus typing 
committee and the findings that polio virus travelled the blood in the 
early stages of infection, a Swedish team also began experiments to find a 
vaccine against polio.
 16. Oshinsky, n. 4, p. 58.
 17. The most thorough work explaining events in polio research is still: Paul, n. 1.
 18. Norrby, Erling; Prusiner, Stanley B. Polio and Nobel Prizes: Looking back 50 years. Annals of 
Neurology. 2007; 61: 385-395.
 19. Oshinsky, n. 4, p. 125-127.
 20. Paul, n. 1, p. 417.
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2.1.  Swedish polio vaccine research 
The initiative to produce a Swedish vaccine was set up in 1952 by professors 
Sven Gard, Gunnar Olin, and Tore Wesslén 21. They put together a working 
group that consisted of ten members from three different departments, 
all geographically located at Stockholm 22. Gunnar Olin, was head of the 
State Bacteriologic Laboratory (SBL), and together with professor Gard he 
became the most well-known character in Swedish polio vaccine research. 
Gard said in an interview from the 1980s that during this period of his life, 
he was «breathing» polio research twenty-four hours a day 23. Not only was 
he heavily involved in the vaccine research, he also served as member and 
chairman of the Swedish National Polio Organisation (today named: RTP) 
and was part of several international collaborations. The RTP was originally 
founded in 1946 by polio survivors but in 1949 the board decided to try 
and bring in «people in leading positions in society» to raise awareness and 
money to fight the disease and its consequences in Sweden. This became 
a successful strategy. Gard was asked to serve as chairman and several 
prominent persons became involved in the organisation. Fundraising 
became crucial and the RTP, together with Solstickan (Swedish Match), 
Aftonbladet (a Swedish newspaper) and Radiohjälpen (the Swedish state 
radio) succeeded well in its task and its funding came to support both polio 
survivors as well as polio vaccine research 24.
There was, and had been for a long time, a great concern among the 
public to solve the ravaging polio epidemics. Sven Gard, Gunnar Olin and 
others were part of a long tradition of Swedish researchers devoted to 
deciphering the disease. Northern Sweden had been the scene of the world’s 
first recorded epidemic of «Poliomyelitis anterior acuta» in 1881 25. These 
early epidemics enabled Swedish medical science to become involved and 
early on acquire a leading role in international medical research on the 
disease. Karl-Oskar Medin, a paediatrician at the Karolinska Institutet in 
 21. Lundbäck, Holger. Vaccination mot polio. Läkartidningen. 1965; 62 (8): 618-623.
 22. Gunnar Olin, Astrid Fagreus, Tore Wesslén, L. Heller, Erik Lycke and G. Wrange from SBL, Arne 
Svedmyr and L. Kjellén from Stockholms stads bakteriologiska laboratorium and Sven Gard 
and M. Uhler at the department for virus research, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm.
 23. Jakten på polioboven. Vetandets värld, Sveriges Radio P1, 26/05/1982. The National Archives 
for Sound and Picture, Stockholm (digitalized archive).
 24. Axelsson, n. 2, p. 175-180.
 25. Axelsson, n. 8.
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Stockholm, is famous for carrying out the first scientific examination of an 
ongoing polio epidemic in 1887 26. Medin considered polio to be an acute 
infectious disease, affecting the nervous system, and able to cause epidemics. 
He presented these results at an international medical conference in Berlin 
in 1890 and a publication came out that same year 27.
Medin’s pupil, Dr. Ivar Wickman, carefully investigated and mapped 
more than one thousand victims in Sweden’s first nation-wide epidemic in 
1905. By mapping these cases of polio and personally visiting the homes 
of more than three hundred polio victims, Wickman concluded that polio 
was often spread by people who appeared to be healthy but nevertheless 
were affected by the disease. Wickman named these «abortive cases» and 
his theory on polio epidemiology was largely accepted by medical science 
by 1910 28.
The methods used to investigate appearance of polio were, until Karl 
Landsteiner and Erwin Popper’s discovery of the filterable virus in 1908, 
mainly based on clinical observation and epidemiological mapping. From 
1910 onwards, science turned to the laboratory, and monkeys were used to 
explore the characteristics of polio. Simon Flexner, the head of the Rockefeller 
Institute, became a central figure in polio research 29. Sweden also turned 
to the laboratory and established the SBL in 1909. The first head of the 
laboratory was Alfred Petterson but he was succeeded by Carl Kling in 
1919 and he came to lead the SBL for almost three decades. In 1945 Kling 
stepped down in favor of Gunnar Olin who then led the laboratory into 
the period of polio vaccine production. Nevertheless, from the first days 
in 1910 until the SBL closed in 1993, polio was a main focus 30.
2.2.  Vaccine procedures 
In a discussion at the Swedish Society of Medicine in May 1954, the grand 
old man of Swedish Bacteriology, Carl Kling, spoke and underlined that 
 26. John Paul devoted an entire chapter to Medin in his book. Paul, n. 1, p. 71-78.
 27. Medin, Oskar. En epidemi af infantile paralysi. Hygiea. 1890; 52 (9): 657-668. See also: Axelsson, 
n. 2, p. 73.
 28. Smallman-Raynor; Cliff, n. 8, p. 95-102. Axelsson, n. 2, p. 78-80. Rogers, n. 8, p. 141-143.
 29. Grimshaw, n. 8.
 30. Winter, Carin. Statens Bakteriologiska Laboratorium 1909-1993. Stockholm: Statens Bakterio-
logiska laboratorium; 1993. 
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«Sweden was marching alongside other nations» 31. Earlier that evening, Sven 
Gard, Gunnar Olin, Tore Wesslén, and Arne Svedberg had spoken about 
the latest achievements in the progress of making a Swedish inactivated 
polio vaccine. They were optimistic but extremely cautious and Gunnar 
Olin highlighted that, although it looked like they soon might find a safe 
well-functioning vaccine, there were several obstacles that needed to be 
overcome along the way. One of the most problematic issues according to 
Olin was the media. «The publicity regarding the [vaccine research] is huge 
and often untrustworthy: newspapers often give the impression that the 
victory has already been won. That is just not true» 32. It is fairly obvious 
that Olin was not only referring to the research being done in Sweden but 
also to research overseas and especially by Jonas Salk in Pittsburgh. Dr. 
Salk’s research was often covered in Swedish papers as well. However the 
Swedish researchers were not convinced that Jonas Salk was heading the 
straight way. Olin emphasized that if Salk’s current work gave encouraging 
results there was still an enormous task ahead to further evaluate the best 
way to produce a vaccine 33.
The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis funded between 1948 and 
1962 five large international meetings devoted solely to poliomyelitis 34. At 
its third meeting in Rome the making of the vaccine was the prime aim. At 
that meeting Sven Gard criticized Jonas Salk and the procedures with which 
he used to kill off the vaccine. Gard argued that when his team had tried 
to follow Salk’s methods the virus was not always inactivated. He needed 
much more time to kill off the virus than the nine days Salk advocated, 
preferably twelve weeks 35. Gard presented a research that suggested that Salk 
should change some of his methods and that other strains might be more 
appropriate to use when making a safe vaccine. Salk disagreed with Gard 
and argued that it was not a question of how to best inactivate the virus 
 31. Barnförlamningsprofylax. Svenska läkarsällskapets diskussion. Nordisk Medicin. 1954; 52 (2): 
1387-1389 (1388).
 32. Olin, Gunnar. Barnförlamningsprofylax, förutsättningar och möjligheter. Nordisk Medicin. 1954. 
52 (2): 1689-1693 (1693).
 33. Olin, n. 32. 
 34. Porras, María-Isabel; Báguena, María-José; Ballester, Rosa. Spain and the international scientific 
conferences on polio, 1940s-1960s. Dynamis. 2010; 30: 91-118.
 35. Discussion panel. Poliomyelitis. Papers and discussions presented at the third international 
poliomyelitis conference. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company; 1955, p. 202-205. See also 
Offit, n. 10, 41-43.
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but more of what concentrations were chosen to produce the vaccine. Also, 
during the same session, the American virologist Albert Sabin advocated 
that a live attenuated vaccine would work much better than the inactivated 
vaccine that Salk was making 36.
However, despite the criticism, Jonas Salk did not make the proposed 
changes in the inactivation methods and the largest human vaccine trial 
was underway in 1954. This trail went on for one year and in a very famous 
public announcement on 12 April 1955, Dr. Thomas Francis, who had led 
an independent committee to evaluate the trial, declared Salk’s vaccine 
as safe, potent and effective. The licensing of the vaccine for commercial 
use was initiated immediately at the Laboratory of Biologics Control in 
Washington. The laboratory in Washington was not financed or staffed to 
be able to test each dose of vaccine when it had gone into mass production. 
They had to trust the companies (six American and one Canadian) that 
were licensed to make the vaccine. The vaccination began immediately in 
the USA as well as in Canada.
2.3.  A Swedish inactivated polio vaccine
Historian David Oshinsky has done a magnificent job in describing the 
scenes of victory (and the circus) surrounding the dates of the release 
of the vaccine, where Salk instantly became a national hero. Jonas Salk 
had conquered polio. Few researchers have been able to repeat his public 
success 37. The good news travelled fast and reached the Swedish people 
through radio and newspapers published on 14 April 1955. That day 
Swedish newspapers had headlines bearing remembrance of successful 
war victories, «Polio conquered» 38, «Victory over death and suffering» 39, 
«An enemy of the people defeated» 40 and «Triumph for science» 41. One 
of the newspapers even suggested that the 12th of April should become a 
 36. Discussion panel, n. 35.
 37. Oshinsky, n. 4, p. 214-216. 
 38. Svenska Dagbladet. 13 Apr 1955.
 39. Piteåtidningen. 14 Apr 1955.
 40. Östgöten. 14 Apr 1955.
 41. Folket. 14 Apr 1955.
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national holiday 42. The public demand was that the Salk vaccine needed 
to be bought and brought to Sweden immediately.
The Swedish experts in the field were also interviewed. Professor Gard 
did not share the massive appraisal of Salk’s achievement and adopted an 
attitude of reserve. Gard said on the Swedish national radio that he wanted 
to wait before ordering the Salk vaccine, until he had carefully read the 
scientific report. At that point in time, the largest Swedish tabloids interpreted 
this as envy of the fact that Salk had presented a vaccine before Gard and 
the Swedish medical team 43. The large tabloid Expressen commented on 
the 14th of April that «a touch of envy has unfortunately become visible 
among the Swedish researchers, especially professor Sven Gard’s comments 
regarding the Salk vaccine» 44.
Few outside of Sweden may be aware that only seven days after Salk’s 
triumph, on 19 April 1955, Gard and Olin presented a Swedish polio 
vaccine. This particular research had been made possible by grants from 
Kung Gustav V Åttio-årsfond and the RTP. The vaccine was an inactivated 
vaccine but different from Salk’s in several ways. It was inactivated at other 
temperatures, Gard and Olin did not use the same virus strains Salk had 
used and theirs were grown in tissue from human embryos. While Salk had 
used monkeys, the Swedish vaccine had first been tested on guinea pigs and 
rabbits and later on humans, although it was not such an enormous human 
trial as Salk’s 45. During the spring of 1954, the researchers had planned to 
vaccinate school children in four different grades in twelve Swedish counties 
[län], but settled with 2.000 children in Stockholm. The children had been 
selected during a scanning of immunity levels and those that lacked immunity 
to all or two of the three virus types were chosen 46. The Swedish Royal 
Medical Board [Kungliga Medicinalstyrelsen] decided to use the Swedish 
vaccine for the upcoming vaccinations that were scheduled to begin in the 
spring. Nevertheless, it was considered important to import American Salk 
 42. Nyheterna. 16 Apr 1955.
 43. Aftonbladet. 16 Apr 1955.
 44. Expressen. 14 Apr 1955.
 45. Olin, n. 32, p. 1689-1693.
 46. Gard, Sven. Poliomyelitis vaccine studies in Sweden. Bruxelles: Association Européenne contre 
la Poliomyélite; vol. 3, 1956, p. 24-29. Olin, n. 32. 
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vaccine as the Medical Board stated that the Swedish vaccine would not be 
enough to inoculate the three age groups as had been planned 47.
3. The Cutter incident
On 28 April 1955, Swedish media reported the news of the Cutter incident. 
Sven Gard and the other Swedish polio researchers had not been informed 
much earlier. However, David Oshinsky shows that reports of polio victims 
started to arrive on the 24th of April and that American scientists met 
confidentially two days later in Washington, United States, to discuss the 
vaccine related cases and to find ways to limit the damage 48. Two weeks 
later, on the 6th of May, Leonard Scheele, U.S. surgeon general, halted the 
American campaign to further investigate all vaccine producing companies. 
It was soon concluded that the Cutter laboratories bore sole responsibility 
for all cases and the American IPV campaign resumed in late May. Still, 
Paul Offit has showed that yet another company, Wyeth, caused several 
cases of polio in the first weeks of vaccination. An expert report by Neal 
Nathanson described 37 vaccine associated cases. However, the report of 
the «Wyeth problem» was only known to a handful of people and never 
released to the media, public health officers or polio vaccine advisers 49.
Events in Sweden unfolded differently. Only two days after the Cutter 
incident was publically released, on the 30th of April, the Medical Board 
decided that Swedish children would not be vaccinated with either the 
Swedish or the American vaccine. It is worth noting that this was more than 
a week before the Americans halted their campaign. The major reason for 
not using the Swedish vaccine was that Gard, Olin, and their research team 
had difficulties in interpreting one of the control tests and the incidents 
taking place in the USA came to be seen as confirmation that further tests 
were needed to make sure not to repeat a similar incident on Swedish soil 50. 
Professors Gard and Olin were quoted in the media as saying that, with 
the American Cutter events unfolding, the Swedish population had also 
 47. Kommuniké till TT ang det svenska polioympämnet. National Archives, Stockholm Medicinal-
styrelsensarkiv. Hälsovårdsbyrån,. FXXXXVIII, Poliofrågor 1953-1956.
 48. Oshinsky, n. 4, p. 221-222.
 49. Offit, n. 10, p. 102-103.
 50. Kungl. Majt:ts [Royal Majestys] proposition nr 91. Stockholm. 1956.
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become aware of the dangers of the vaccine 51. An interesting shift in the 
treatment of Swedish scientists can be observed in the media, illustrated 
below by a quote from the liberal tabloid Göteborgsposten:
«The somewhat subdued statements made in this country were interpreted 
in some places as jealousy over that the Americans arrived first, because our 
researchers also found themselves standing at the finish line. But they spoke 
out of wisdom, based on the knowledge of how infinitely careful you have 
to be and how many risks and errors there are. That their caution has been 
entitled has now quickly been confirmed, and the insinuations against our 
scientists, that they might have certain ulterior motives, have lost its sting» 52.
The Cutter incident clearly marked a turnaround of opinion, especially 
for Gard who until that point had been the one most criticized by the 
Swedish media. He was now declared an outstanding scientist who had 
foreseen the incident. Gard’s status also seemed to increase internationally 
as he later became elected president of the Association Européenne contre 
la Poliomyélite. In other words, even if the Cutter incident was a setback 
to the polio vaccination and devastated the lives of many Americans, in 
Sweden it seemed to have restored some of the public faith in Swedish 
researchers committed to finding a safe polio vaccine. When Gard officially 
called off the national vaccination campaign on 1 May 1955, there were 
no complaints in the media. At that point, it was evident that polio was 
not yet conquered.
Immediately after the decision to suspend the 1955 vaccination new 
plans for the following spring were designed. Further testing of the Swedish 
vaccine was needed and the time frame also gave a possibility of producing 
enough vaccine for Sweden not to have to import American vaccine. However, 
in January 1956 the Medical Board announced that a nationwide vaccination 
would not be carried through. It was still assumed that, during the spring, 
vaccination would be made possible on a limited scale. In letters circulating 
between Olin and the Medical Officer of Health, Rolf Bergman, thirteen 
counties were included in the plans but at the end of February 1956 there 
were only six. In the planned vaccination Olin described that it intended 
to offer «inoculation of all children born on odd dates in any year 1945-
 51. Expressen. 4 May 1955.
 52. Göteborgstidningen. 28 Apr 1955.
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1948» 53.There were also plans for utilizing control groups. Nevertheless, 
the 1956 polio vaccination campaign was cancelled some months later. 
This time around there was more disappointment among politicians and 
the media and there were reports that some Swedes had left for Denmark 
to get a shot of polio 54. The scientists and Medical Board stood by their 
decision. It had become evident that the rebuilding and renovation of the 
SBL premises that were needed to make it suitable for vaccine production 
could not be completed in time for a large scale campaign 55. In short, the 
SBL had not been able to produce enough vaccine and the Medical Board 
was not interested in importing American vaccine.
3.1.  The disappearance of Swedish polio epidemics
Polio vaccination began in 1957 in Sweden. At that point neighboring 
Denmark had been vaccinating for two years and had almost managed 
to vaccinate their entire population. The Danes had used Salk methods 
to inactivate the virus but the vaccine was produced by the Danish State 
Serum Institute, a laboratory with no other end aim than public health 56. 
Sweden used vaccine produced by the researchers at SBL and Karolinska 
Institute. However, they could not produce enough vaccine domestically and 
eventually the Medical Board decided to import from an American vaccine 
company, Eli Lilly and Company. During the 1957 vaccination campaign 
these two vaccines were carefully monitored, enabling researchers to keep 
track of which children received Swedish vaccine and which received 
the American vaccine. After the 1957 campaign Sweden used solely the 
Swedish IPV 57.
On national radio on 7 January 1957 Gunnar Olin presented the benefits 
of inoculating children born between the years 1950 and 1953. He gave no 
guarantees that all those were vaccinated would not get polio, since some 
children might have been infected before vaccination. He informed that they 
were going to use both Swedish and imported American vaccine and the 
latter had been improved and 40 million children in the U.S. and Canada 
 53. Poliofrågor. Riksarkivet. n. 47. 
 54. Axelsson, n. 2, p. 153. 
 55. Winter, n. 30, p. 15.
 56. Paul, n. 1, p. 436.
 57. Fagreus; Böttiger, n. 6, p. 274.
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had been vaccinated without any reports of complications. Olin finished 
his «speech to the nation» with the words:
«Consider that it is a preventive measure only. When the epidemic has broken 
out, it is too late. It is now the decision has to be taken if You want Your Child 
to have the possibility of protection, given by this year’s vaccine» 58.
The vaccine campaign was set up and organized by the Medical 
Board. They had appointed regional leaders, namely each county’s first 
provincial physician, and the doctors in charge of medical care in Stockholm, 
Gothenburg, Malmö and Helsingborg. The IPV was completely voluntary 
and free, and was done by school health services for school children and 
child care units for younger children who had not yet started school. Parents 
needed to sign a form allowing the treatment. The vaccine that was injected 
into the left upper arm was conducted with two treatments at least three 
weeks apart, which then would be reinforced by another injection after 7-12 
months. The campaign was planned to run until the 30th of June when the 
«polio season» was at hand. To assess the efficacy of the vaccine a blood 
test was taken from a small number of schoolchildren 59.
Concerning the polio vaccine campaign it became obvious in mid-
January 1957 that the interest in the vaccine had not entirely met the 
expectations of the Medical Board. In a letter to the regional leaders, Rolf 
Bergman announced that they should continue to ask parents to send their 
children for the polio vaccination to increase the effect of the campaign 60.
Table 1 shows the number of people vaccinated until 1965. It also 
explains that 717.000 children were vaccinated in 1957 and that meant that 
the campaign reached 177.000 fewer children than the 900,000 than the 
Medical Board had hoped. Furthermore, Table 1 shows which age groups 
were first approached and how many cases with and without paralysis 
occurred during the period. It clearly illustrates how the virus, after some 
years of vaccination, stopped circulating in society thereby putting an end 
to polio epidemics in Sweden.
 58. Axelsson, n. 2.
 59. Axelsson, n. 2.
 60. Kungl. Medicinalstyrelsen [Royal Medical Board] Stockholm 3. D: nr 44 Hv/57. Document owned 
by the author.
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Table 1. Reported polio cases, types of polio virus, vaccinations by age-group and 
number of new vaccinations, Sweden 1950-1965
Year
Polio cases 
with paralysis
Polio cases 
without 
paralysis
Type Virus
Vaccinated
by age group 
Number of new 
vaccinations
1950 1164 540
1951 339 212
1952 363 129
1953 3029 2061 1,2,3
1954 544 455 1,2,3
1955 325 161 1,2,3
1956 248 301 1,2,3
1957 148 102 1,2,3 4-11 717 000
1958 155 37 1,2,3 4,13-15 358 000
1959 42 14 1,2,3 2-26 1 039 000
1960 15 3 1,2 1-40 489 000
1961 64 60 1 1-51 1 093 000
1962 6 8 1,3 1-52 641 000
1963 0 0 1-53 227 000
1964 0 1 2 1-54 159 000
1965 1 1 1 Everyone 216 000
Source: Poliofrågor, Hälsovårdsbyrån, Medicinalstyrelsen, Riksarkivet, Stockholm.
There were a few reports of resistance to participation in the campaign. 
The County of Jönköping endured vaccine resistance that resulted in low 
participating rates at specific places. Nonetheless, the physician responsible for 
the entire county judged that it did not interfere with the overall good result 
of the region 61. Although Sweden started two years later than countries like 
the USA, Denmark and Canada it was soon evident that the Swedish polio 
vaccine campaign was very successful. After a slow start it achieved close 
to 100% participation from the population. Several studies have confirmed 
that the Swedish IPV was also more potent than the American vaccine due 
to the fact that it used a different method to inactivate the virus. 1961 was 
the last year when poliovirus circulating in society caused an epidemic 62. 
 61. Axelsson, n. 2, p. 159.
 62. Fagraeus; Böttiger, n. 6, p. 274-275.
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Most other countries later shifted from IPV to OPV. Sweden had minor 
trials using OPV and there were extensive plans to shift from IPV around 
1963-64 63. In the end Sweden decided to remain faithful to the IPV and 
has been so ever since 64.
4. Concluding discussion
What might we learn from the history of polio vaccine production? In the 
mid 1990s Harold V. Wyatt provided some answers in order to assist future 
vaccine research concerning infectious diseases, especially HIV and AIDS. 
He concluded that the history of polio vaccines has illustrated that therapy 
and immunization may have side effects and must be carefully tested, that 
errors may occur in the production and handling of the vaccine, that the 
same disease may occur in different ways in different parts of the world, 
that there may be some population groups with different susceptibility and 
response, that people’s attitude to the vaccine can change and that the trials 
of therapies and immunization will fail until the correct theoretical starting 
points have been found 65. We can all be supportive of Wyatt’s conclusions 
although it unmistakeably carries an idea that a «real» theoretical foundation 
will always reveal itself. What if it never will?
Historians like Lindner and Blume have highlighted how commercial 
interests, national traditions, international relations, or global agendas 
influence not only countries’ decision making, in using one vaccine over 
the other, but also the success of a vaccination campaign. Based on the fact 
that OPV never came to be used in Sweden, the Swedish experience could 
easily be argued to correspond well with Lindner and Blume’s analysis of 
path dependency and vaccine production.
This article brings to the fore the role of the sometimes conflicting 
approaches between academic research, such as medicine, on one hand and 
the media and the public on the other. Historian Peter Sköld has showed that 
 63. Tallmo, Sigrid. Varför väljer WHO inte det säkraste poliovaccinet? Läkartidningen. 1999; 98 
(48): 5343.
 64. Pagano, Joseph S. et al. Chat type 1 attenuated poliovirus vaccine prepared on human diploid 
cells: a study in 135 Swedish children. Bruxelles: Association Européenne contre la Poliomyé-
lite; vol. 8, 1963, p. 498-507.
 65. Wyatt, n. 8, p. 943–950.
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the few contemporary Swedish newspapers, alongside doctors and priests, 
were all in support of smallpox vaccination when it was made available in 
the early 1800s. This soon made it a success. In order to perpetuate the 
effects of the smallpox vaccination, the Swedish state made it mandatory in 
1815 66. The role of the media was also evident when the vaccine haemophilus 
influenzae type b (Hib vaccine) was introduced in Sweden in the 1990s. 
Garpenholt (2000) showed that, for a successful vaccine campaign, the disease 
must be considered a clear threat, the vaccine needs to be recognized as safe 
and effective both among the population and physicians, the importance 
of distribution; people need to know where to go to get vaccinated, and 
that the media plays an important in publishing the news of cases of illness 
in Hib 67. Concerning the polio vaccine, researchers and the media at one 
point ended up on different sides of the fence. They shared the same 
goal, of course: to get the Swedish population vaccinated before another 
big epidemic struck the country. Still the ideas of what constituted a safe 
vaccine varied in the media, the public and medical experts. I believe that 
both perspectives are understandable. Even after the Cutter incident, it was 
obvious to all that for instance Denmark and Canada did not cancel their 
campaigns and continued to use a vaccine based on Salk’s method, without 
any problem. The Swedish people continued contracting polio during 1955 
and 1956, so from a public point of view it was reasonable to question 
why Sweden did not want to import vaccine during those years. From the 
Swedish researchers’ perspective it was, of course, a more complex matter.
One of the complicating factors may have been the many strong 
personalities in the international polio vaccine research of the 1950s. 
Sweden’s leading polio researcher, Sven Gard, openly critiqued Jonas Salk 
and his choice of methods and materials for his vaccine. This critique was 
also evident in Gard’s work within the Nobel Committee. Using the Nobel 
Archives, Erling Norrby and Stanley B. Prusiner recently published an 
exciting description of the work within this exclusive scientific milieu that 
they both know very well. Norrby and Prusiner shed light on a question 
asked many times; why was Salk never selected as Nobel laureate? Jonas Salk 
 66. Sköld, Peter. The key to success: The role of local government in the organization of smallpox 
vaccination in Sweden. Medical History. 2000; 45: 201-226.
 67. Garpenholt, Örjan. Vaccination against Haemophilus influenzae type b in Sweden. Aspects of 
epidemiology, economy and the process of introduction. Linköping: Linköping University; 
1999.
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was nominated for a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine more than once, 
the first time in 1955. Every nominee has an evaluator and as a prominent 
member of the Nobel committee, Sven Gard evaluated Salk’s work every 
time. 1956 Gard made an extended evaluation where he pointed out that 
Salk, in principal, had not contributed anything new to the field and had 
only exploited discoveries made by others. Gard underlined that some of 
Salk’s working hypotheses in fact were incorrect and that it could not be 
excluded that the Cutter incident was a «result directly from his practical 
application of such incorrect hypotheses» 68. Needless to say, Gard’s extended 
evaluation in 1956 made further Salk nominations fruitless.
Then again, as Ulrike Lindner showed, the Cutter incident came to 
create an international discussion of vaccine safety standards. Studying 
Britain and West Germany, Lindner concluded that national scientific 
cultures, along with how health officials and governments perceive other 
countries’ safety standards, influenced the implementation of IPV 69. Adding 
to that argument, Alison Day also highlighted how New Zealand medical 
authorities, after the Cutter incident, regarded all American produced IPV 
as below standard and unsafe. New Zealand however did believe that the 
IPV was useful and came to import Australian and British produced vaccine 
for their polio immunization programme 70.
Contrary to New Zealand and Britain, the Swedish Medical Board, guided 
by the research team at SBL, did not doubt all American manufacturers 
and imported Salk IPV from Eli Lilly and Company for the first polio 
vaccination campaign. But they were not confident that the campaign would 
be without problems. The fear of repeating the Cutter incident on Swedish 
soil was apparent. This was also evident in the words of Olin’s successor at 
SBL, Holger Lundbäck, who wrote that it required a lot of courage to give 
the green light to a Swedish IPV campaign in 1957 71. With those words 
Lundbäck echoed all of his predecessors at the SBL and previous Swedish 
polio researchers. The scientific culture shaped by Medin, Wickman, Kling, 
Gard and Olin had always advocated a cautious approach. ❚
 68. Norrby; Prusiner, n. 18, p. 393. 
 69. Lindner, n. 12, p. 245-246.
 70. Day, n. 11, p. 57-58.
 71. Winter, n. 30, p. 15.
